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The issue of the failure of incumbent firms in the face of radical technical change has been a
central question in the technology strategy domain for some time. We add to prior contributions
by highlighting the role a firm’s existing set of complementary assets have in influencing
its investment in alternative technological trajectories. We develop an analytical model that
considers firm heterogeneity with respect to both technological trajectories and complementary
assets. Complementary assets play a dual role in incumbents’ investment behavior toward radical
technological change: they are not only resources (pipes) that can buffer firms from technology
change, but also prisms through which firms view those changes, influencing both the magnitude
of resources that should be invested and the trajectory to which these resources should be
directed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
A long-standing interest in the technology strat-
egy domain has been the question of the failure
of incumbent firms in the face of radical tech-
nical change (Christensen, 1997; Henderson and
Clark, 1990; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). In
explaining such failure, early work within eco-
nomics, such as Arrow (1962) and Reinganum
(1983), stressed the incentives established firms
face with respect to innovations that might replace
their existing products or services. The strategy
literature, such as Tushman and Anderson (1986),
and work on evolutionary economics, such as Dosi
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(1982) and Nelson and Winter (1982), emphasized
the distinct capabilities that alternative technolo-
gies may require.
An innovation is radical in the economic sense if
the new technology is a preferred substitute for the
old technology (Arrow, 1962; Reinganum, 1983);
for such innovations, the incumbent’s investment
in innovation will cannibalize its existing prod-
ucts.1 The incumbent’s marginal benefit of invest-
ment is lower than that of the entrant and hence it
will have less incentive to invest than the entrant.
Thus, the economics literature explicitly suggests
that the incumbent failure stems from an under-
investment in radical technologies. An innovation
is viewed as radical in the organizational sense
1 Germane to the current work, Dew, Goldfarb, and Sarasvathy
(2006) extend the Arrow (1962) and Reinganum (1983) analyses
to include the effect of complementary assets on an incumbent’s
incentives in a patent race.
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if the innovation is competence destroying with
respect to a firm’s technical capabilities (Tushman
and Anderson, 1986). With their existing capabil-
ities rendered obsolete, incumbent firms are less
likely to introduce radical innovations compared
to new entrants equipped with the relevant tech-
nical capabilities (Tushman and Anderson, 1986).
Consistent with this implication, Henderson shows
that ‘incumbent firms appear to have rationally
anticipated less productive research efforts when
they invested in innovation that was radical in the
organizational sense, and thus to have invested no
more than entrants’ (Henderson, 1993: 264). That
is, the destruction of capabilities is likely to lead
to a reduction in investment in the associated new
technologies. In this explanation, incumbent firms’
lower investment in radical innovations is not the
cause of incumbent failure; rather, both lower
investments and incumbent failure are driven by
the obsolescence of underlying capabilities.
Contrary to the association between lower
investments and incumbent failure, however, some
in-depth case studies point out a puzzling diver-
gence: incumbent firms often invest significant
amounts in radical innovations, but develop infe-
rior versions of the new technology (Rosenbloom,
2000; Tripsas, 1997; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).
Tripsas (1997) shows that a lack of investment
in R&D was not responsible for incumbent fail-
ure within the typesetter industry, which went
through three generations of radical transforma-
tions. Incumbents actually invested heavily in the
new product generations: ‘qualitative data from
interviews with both management and develop-
ment engineers indicate that the level of invest-
ment by incumbents was at least equivalent to that
of new entrants’ (Tripsas, 1997: 130). However,
the technical performance of products developed
by incumbents during each new technology period
was inferior to the performance of the entrant’s
products. Relatedly, Tripsas and Gavetti (2000)
show that Polaroid committed substantial invest-
ments to digital imaging technologies when such
technologies first emerged as a potential threat to
its instant camera business: ‘An electronic imag-
ing group was formed in 1981, and as part of this
effort work began on a microelectronics labora-
tory. The microelectronics laboratory opened up in
1986 after a capital investment of about $30 mil-
lion, and with an operating budget of about $10
million/year. By 1989, 42 percent of [Polaroid’s]
R&D dollars were devoted to exploring a broad
range of digital imaging technologies’ (Tripsas
and Gavetti, 2000: 1152). Despite such signifi-
cant efforts, Polaroid declared bankruptcy in 2001.
Rosenbloom (2000) shows that National Cash
Register Company (NCR) was among the pioneers
seeking to make a transition to electronics from
mechanical cash registers. NCR began to engage in
in-house electronics research activities as early as
1938 and entered the computer industry in 1953 by
acquiring Computer Research Corporation (CRC),
one of the first computer companies. While NCR
eventually survived the technological change after
decades of restructuring, it encountered a deep cri-
sis in the early stages of this transition.
This gap between the theoretical literature and
empirical observations is further illustrated by
Kodak’s investment behavior vis-a`-vis digital pho-
tography (Benner, 2010; Benner and Tripsas,
2012). Digital photography appears to represent
a radical technological change in both an eco-
nomic and organizational sense. First, from an
economic perspective, digital imaging can dis-
place traditional film-based imaging. As Kodak
entered the digital imaging field, it had to can-
nibalize its own traditional film sales. In con-
trast, the entrants from the computer and consumer
electronics industries, such as HP and Sony, did
not face the same problem. Thus, other things
being equal, this cannibalization effect should have
decreased Kodak’s incentive to invest in the digital
imaging field.
Perhaps a more fundamental factor in determin-
ing Kodak’s investment behavior, however, is the
shift away from the chemistry-based technology
domain of silver halide film to the electronic-
based digital technology domain of digital cam-
eras. R&D initiatives along the new technology
domain rendered obsolete the skills and knowledge
that Kodak accumulated in the chemistry-based
domain. In contrast, new entrants, including both
new ventures and de alio entrants coming from
electronic and computer industries, had a capabil-
ity set consonant with the new technology domain.
Thus, existing theories of both economic sub-
stitutes and competence-destroying change would
predict that Kodak would lag behind in investing
in digital photography.
However, in spite of these considerations,
Kodak made aggressive investment very early on
in digital (Benner, 2010) and, indeed, invented the
first digital camera in 1975. More generally, Kodak
had one of the highest patenting rates in digital
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technology (Benner and Tripsas, 2012) and by the
early 1990s, 40 to 50 percent of Kodak’s patents
were already directed at digital.2 Despite these
early, enormous efforts, Kodak did not achieve
commercial and technical success in the digital
camera market. Indeed, Kodak filed for bankruptcy
protection in January 2012.
One explanation for this paradox is agency
behavior: managers in incumbent firms may squan-
der their retained earnings on new technologies
in which they should not have invested in an
attempt to sustain ultimately unsustainable com-
petitive positions. As a consequence, these incum-
bents may spend enormous amounts of capital
on such technologies without obtaining adequate
returns for their shareholders. From this perspec-
tive, such incumbent firms would better serve their
shareholders by returning cash via dividends or
share buybacks (Jensen, 1993). We do not disagree
with this possibility. In this study, however, we ask
whether there is an economic rationale for incum-
bents’ substantial investments in radical innova-
tions, even in a setting in which these investments
yield little in the way of competitive success. By
doing so, we believe we contribute to a more
complete understanding of the various mechanisms
underlying incumbent firm strategic reorientation
processes (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009).
A PERSPECTIVE ON
COMPLEMENTARY ASSETS AND
TECHNOLOGICAL TRAJECTORIES
Theoretical basis
To address the puzzling divergence between
investment efforts and innovation outcome, we
suggest that it is important to examine not only
the impact of a firm’s existing capabilities on the
magnitude of its investments in new technologies,
but also the qualitative nature of those investments
and, in particular, the specific technological trajec-
tories the firm pursues. The direction of techno-
logical change is a central element in Christensen’s
(1997) argument that established firms pursue tech-
nological trajectories that are consonant with the
2 This figure is based on Kodak’s patent data from
the NBER Patent Data Project (https://sites.google.
com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads) and uses the
digital camera patent classes defined by Benner and Tripsas
(2012).
firms’ existing consumers. Christensen’s (1997)
important contribution pointed to the critical role
of firms’ resource allocation processes and to the
strong claim that existing customers and market
segments served might have on such processes. He
argues that incumbent disk drive manufacturers did
not lack in resource commitments to research and
new product development or in underlying capa-
bilities but, as a result of being embedded in a
particular set of customer relations, were led to
continue to invest in the established market seg-
ment and to largely ignore promising new techno-
logical approaches. In a similar vein, Adner and
Snow (2010) highlight the role of demand hetero-
geneity on incumbent firms’ strategic reorientation.
The arrival of the new technology reveals het-
erogeneous consumer preferences on the demand
side. While incumbent firms can choose to com-
pete head-to-head with new entrants on the new
technology, they may also choose to strategically
retreat to a smaller niche where their old technolo-
gies are still applicable or possibly redeploy their
old technologies to a new market. As a result, it
might appear that the incumbent failed in the main-
stream market, although it could have strategically
chosen to exit the market or create a hybrid prod-
uct, melding the old and new technology to serve
the mainstream market.
This loose coupling between the magnitude
of investment and commercial outcome is also
addressed by recent work that takes a cognitive
perspective on firms’ technology strategies (Ben-
ner and Tripsas, 2012; Gilbert, 2005; Tripsas and
Gavetti, 2000). Incumbent firms may choose to
invest in radical innovations because they believe
in the importance of major inventions, somewhat
independent of their technological capabilities to
pursue these innovations. For instance, Polaroid
decided to invest in digital innovation, not because
it is similar to instant photography in terms of
capability requirements, but because digital inno-
vation was viewed as another ‘major invention’
like instant photography (Tripsas and Gavetti,
2000) and consistent with the firm’s, and in partic-
ular Edwin Land’s (Polaroid cofounder and pres-
ident) sense of identity as an ‘innovator.’ In gen-
eral, cognitive frames, often formed in incum-
bents’ antecedent competitive contexts, may work
as road maps in the face of high uncertainty during
periods of technological discontinuity (Benner and
Tripsas, 2012). However, such beliefs can also hin-
der the commercialization of the research output if
Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 35: 1257–1278 (2014)
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the business model underlying commercialization
conflicts with the firm’s prior belief, such as the
case of Polaroid’s effort to impose the razor/razor
blade business model on the commercialization
of the digital camera (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).
Such a cognitive bias may manifest itself via the
introduction of a hybrid product to the market,
which melds elements of the old product tech-
nology even though consumers may prefer a pure
play new product unencumbered by this prior
history.
The explanation put forth here follows in the
spirit of these explanations, examining both the
magnitude and direction (technological trajectory)
of an established firm’s investment in new
technologies in the face of possible technological
change and the threat of new entrants. We offer
a supplemental perspective based on forward-
looking rational calculations on the part of firms
and incorporating a fundamental asymmetry
between established incumbent enterprises and
new entrants. Clearly, as early arguments by
Dosi (1982) and Tushman and Anderson (1986)
suggest, incumbents and entrants may differ in
their technological capabilities, with incumbent
firms developing distinct technological capabilities
along specific technological trajectories. However,
even if one puts this factor aside, there is another
basis of asymmetry, which is that established
firms are likely to have an array of complementary
assets in manufacturing, distribution, marketing
and the like (Teece, 1986). While Teece points
to the important role that complementary assets
have on the ability of firms to appropriate the
returns to innovative efforts, Mitchell (1989)
and Tripsas (1997) demonstrate the importance
of complementary assets in buffering incumbent
firms from technological transitions. Perhaps
because the original motivation for considering
complementary assets was the issue of an inno-
vator’s ability to appropriate value from R&D
investments conditional on a successful R&D
outcome (Teece, 1986), the previous literature on
complementary assets tends to focus on the effect
of complementary assets on the ex post perfor-
mance of incumbent firms (Hill and Rothaermel,
2003).
We wish to build on these important prior contri-
butions regarding the role of complementary assets
and examine the ex ante investment incentives
created by the presence (or absence) of comple-
mentary assets. In particular, we examine both
how a firm’s choice of technological trajectory
and how its level of investment along the cho-
sen trajectory may be influenced by the mag-
nitude of its complementary assets. Incumbent
firms may choose technological trajectories that
are arguably less promising, but comprise tech-
nological approaches that are compatible with,
and leverage, its existing array of complementary
assets. This observation suggests a further refine-
ment in what is meant by a ‘radical’ technological
change. In this regard, a change is viewed as rad-
ical if it disrupts the relation between the firm’s
existing set of complementary assets and the new
technological trajectory. We examine the condi-
tions under which a firm’s complementary assets
may cause it to choose to invest in what is viewed
a priori as an inferior technology. Further, we con-
sider the competitive consequences of the choice
of technological trajectory and the magnitude of
investment on the part of an established and entrant
firm in view of their differential levels of comple-
mentary assets.
Complementary assets and trajectory choices
The prototypical setting one might imagine is an
established firm with a substantial stock of com-
plementary assets (e.g., substantial downstream
resources with regard to distribution and brand
name), but having its old technical basis negated
by the emergence of a radical technological change
and facing a decision as to which technologi-
cal trajectory along which to invest. We use the
term ‘technological trajectory’ to connote the par-
ticular class of technologies the firm is building
upon and the nature of the technological perfor-
mance attributes it is attempting to enhance (Dosi,
1982). For simplicity, we consider two trajec-
tories: a trajectory that may have lower inher-
ent promise to be preferred by the market but
allows the incumbent to leverage its existing com-
plementary assets or a trajectory that has higher
inherent promise but would diminish the value
of its complementary assets. We term the for-
mer as a complement-preserving trajectory and
the latter as a complement-disrupting trajectory.
In contrast, potential entrants, lacking comple-
mentary assets, face no such trade-off and will
favor the complement-disrupting approach. Our
analysis recognizes that the link between invest-
ments, trajectory choices, and market outcomes
is influenced by the presence of complementary
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assets. Central to this perspective is the hetero-
geneity along different dimensions of the firm’s
capabilities and the interdependence among them
(Helfat, 1997; Mitchell, 1989; Sosa, 2009; Taylor
and Helfat, 2009; Teece, 1986; Tripsas, 1997).
Specifically, complementary assets can have a
dual role in affecting incumbents’ R&D invest-
ment. On the one hand, complementary assets, if
fungible, amplify returns on R&D investments for
incumbent firms, thereby increasing incumbent
firms’ economic incentive to invest in the new
technical domain. Specifically, given the same
R&D efforts, a larger stock of complementary
assets allows a firm to appropriate more of the
returns from its R&D investments (Teece 1986,
Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001; Girotra,
Terwiesch, and Ulrich, 2007). This implies a
higher marginal benefit from R&D investment
and, thus, a higher investment incentive. The
empirical findings of Mitchell (1989) and King
and Tucci (2002) that experience in prior sub-
fields is positively associated with a firm’s
likelihood of entering new, related subfields is
consistent with this argument. Even more directly
supportive of this argument is Helfat’s (1997)
work that indicates that firms are more likely
to develop technologies that can utilize existing
complementary technologies.
On the other hand, complementary assets may
also bias incumbents’ choice of technological tra-
jectories. As Teece (1986) notes, complementary
assets may be cospecialized to a specific tech-
nology and, therefore, complementary assets can
be trajectory specific in the sense that they are
valuable in conjunction with a certain trajectory
but much less valuable in conjunction with others.
Therefore, incumbents endowed with complemen-
tary assets may have an incentive to choose a tech-
nological trajectory along which they can leverage
their complementary assets, even if such a trajec-
tory has lower inherent promise to be preferred by
the market.
Combining these two perspectives, we exam-
ine the dual role complementary assets play
with respect to incumbents’ investment behaviors
toward radical technological change: complemen-
tary assets are not only resources—in the con-
text of network ties Podolny (2001) refers to as
‘pipes,’ that can buffer firms from technology
change—but are also ‘prisms’ through which they
view those changes, in terms of both the mag-
nitude of resources that should be invested and
the trajectory to which these resources should be
directed. When complementary assets are specific
to a less promising technological trajectory, the
incumbent is faced with a trade-off between fully
leveraging its complementary assets and choosing
a more promising technological trajectory.
To illustrate this trade-off, reconsider the case
of NCR noted earlier. After NCR acquired an
early leader in the computer industry (CRC), NCR
integrated CRC’s research activities in computer
technology into the framework of NCR’s ‘overall
product development program’ to leverage NCR’s
extensive sales force—one type of comple-
mentary assets (Rosenbloom, 2000: 1087). The
technological trajectory choice was also modified.
‘The binary arithmetic and limited input–output
(I/O) capabilities of the 102-A [a general purpose
computer] were well suited to scientific use, but
appeared to the people in Dayton [where NCR’s
headquarters is located] as obstacles to business
application. As a senior engineer commented,
‘when you talked about a binary machine, you
scared our salesmen’ (Rench, 1984: 26) . . . Under
pressure from Dayton, CRC designed the 102-D,
using decimal arithmetic . . . ’(Rosenbloom, 2000:
1089).
Likewise, while Polaroid invested a signifi-
cant amount in digital photography very early
on, their digital efforts were ‘ . . . guided by a
desire to eventually develop an instant digital
camera/printer product termed ‘PIF’ for Printer
In the Field . . . The 1984 Annual Report’s Letter
to shareholders stated, ‘We believe that there is
considerable potential in developing new hybrid
imaging systems that combine instant photography
and electronics’ . . . Since the output was to be on
instant film, [the PIF concept] leveraged the firm’s
strong film-manufacturing capabilities. It was also,
however, consistent with the firmly held belief in
a razor/blade model’ (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000:
1152).
Similarly, much of Kodak’s early investment
in digital photography derived from its attempt
to leverage complementary assets accumulated
around films, from film production to photo
finishing. Kodak was able to design high-quality
films using its film capabilities and manufacture
them at a low cost based on mass production.
Further, Kodak developed strong relationships
with retailers by providing services and supplies to
those with photofinishing facilities and wholesale
services to those without processing facilities.
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In addition, Kodak built an extensive network of
Kodak Express franchises.3
Photo CD and Advanced Photo System are
two hybrid products embodying Kodak’s ‘film-
based digital imaging strategy’ (Eastman Kodak
Company, 1991: 3) in the early 1990s.4 After
the image is captured with an analog camera, the
Photo CD system allows photofinishers to scan
consumers’ 35 mm negatives to a digital format
and store them on a compact disc (Benner, 2010).
These images can be shown on TV through a
special CD player or on a computer using a CD-
ROM. Consumers can further edit the pictures,
transfer them, and print them. The Advanced
Photo System (APS) adds to the film a transparent
magnetic coating, which can store data such as
the level of brightness and the use of flash
when the picture was taken. Such data can help
photofinishers enhance the quality of the print
(Cohen and Tripsas, 2012).
Ex ante, such a hybrid approach may be a ratio-
nal choice given the uncertain technological path
(e.g., the low home PC adoption rate and nar-
row Internet bandwidth at the time, which might
limit the diffusion of digital cameras). By blend-
ing digital technologies with traditional film tech-
nology and processes, this approach leveraged
Kodaks’ film-based complementary assets. Con-
sumers would still want to buy films, particularly
when films still offered higher resolution than the
digital images available at the time. In this way,
Kodak was able to leverage its capabilities in film
production. Using their relationships with retailers,
Kodak was able to persuade many retailers to add
the Photo CD system to their photofinishing facil-
ities, offering digitization, editing, and additional
features, such as printing greeting cards. The digi-
tal information stored through the APS system also
allowed Kodak-related photofinishing facilities to
produce higher-quality prints. The APS system
also permitted Kodak to more effectively introduce
self-service kiosks. With this approach, Kodak
would still be able to make money from consum-
ables like photo paper and services. This hybrid
3 Kodak also has other complementary assets, such as distribu-
tion channels, to sell films. However, such complementary assets
were fungible to the new technological trajectory, since digital
cameras can be sold through many of the same channels. In an
analysis of the model, we examine how our results are influenced
by the degree of fungibility of complementary assets.
4 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these aspects
of Kodak’s efforts.
approach is in contrast to a pure digital approach,
where pictures are taken through digital camera, do
not need to be processed and printed out, and can
be viewed on a computer and transmitted through
the Internet. Such a pure digital approach would
deprive Kodak of its film-based complementary
assets and force Kodak to compete head-to-head
with consumer electronics firms. Thus, a hybrid
approach had appeal to Kodak, as it allowed the
firm to try to retain its advantage along part of the
value chain, while introducing some digital fea-
tures to enhance the performance of the product
and services it offered. At a minimum, such efforts
might delay consumers’ switch to digital and might
even influence consumers’ behavior in using digi-
tal products in the future by setting a new industry
standard.
Ex post , however, hybrid products tended to
look clumsy due to rapid technological advances.
In particular, with the further development of
the Internet, Internet bandwidth quickly reached
a point where it was sufficiently high for image
transmission. In addition, households widely adopt
personal computers, the price of digital cam-
eras dropped, and the quality of digital cameras
improved. Ultimately, the convenience of taking
and sharing pictures through products like smart
phones and Facebook greatly reduced the need to
print images.
In considering these examples, it is important to
bear in mind that while the probability with which
the technological trajectory chosen by the incum-
bents will ultimately be preferred by the market
might have been lower than that for alternative
technological trajectories, the probability was not
zero (Furr and Snow, 2012). Should the chosen tra-
jectory ultimately be preferred by the market, the
incumbent would be better able to fully leverage
its existing complementary assets and gain greater
market success. Therefore, for a given range of
complementary assets, it may be optimal for the
incumbent to choose the less promising techno-
logical trajectory. Moreover, these complementary
assets may provide an incentive for the incum-
bent to invest more than the entrant ex ante. Ex
post , however, should the trajectory chosen by
the incumbent prove to be an ineffective way to
engage the market, either as a result of the limits of
technical progress along the performance dimen-
sions pursued by the firm or the market’s valuation
of those performance dimensions, the incumbent
may experience an inferior market outcome under
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certain conditions despite its higher investments.
The incumbent firm bets on the trajectory that
yields, in expectation, the greatest profits; how-
ever, due to the impact of its existing stock of com-
plementary assets, this is a different calculation
than choosing the technological trajectory that is
most likely to prove promising. As a consequence,
we should observe at times incumbent firms mak-
ing what appear to be ex post bad ‘bets.’ The dual
role of complementary assets can help explain sit-
uations such as Kodak’s investment behavior and
resulting market outcomes in digital photography.
Kodak’s stock of relevant complementary assets
in the imaging industry created strong economic
incentives to invest in the new technical domain.
However, in order to leverage its complementary
assets, Kodak chose a technological trajectory that
engaged digital technology in a manner that facil-
itated the firm linking this new technology to its
existing assets and ways of competing.5
Complementary assets are an asset to be lever-
aged, but at the same time, they bias a firm’s
strategic choices. As a result of this dual effect,
firms may rationally invest large sums in tech-
nology efforts that yield a relatively modest rate
of technical advance. The incumbent may invest
heavily but achieve a lower likelihood of techni-
cal leadership than similar investments yield for
new enterprises established to pursue these new
technological opportunities. It is important to rec-
ognize that the incumbent may choose different
technological trajectories and, therefore, it is crit-
ical to distinguish between the magnitude of the
investment and its qualitative nature (i.e., the par-
ticular technological trajectory pursued). The ulti-
mate consequences or outcomes that stem from
such investments (relative distance from the tech-
nology frontier, product market success, and the
like) will be a function of the firm’s investments,
technical capabilities, complementary assets, com-
petitors’ actions, and what emerges to constitute
consumer preferences.
An important backdrop to these arguments
is the degree of imperfection in the market for
5 This argument, however, cannot explain the totality of Kodak’s
investments, as Kodak did make substantial early investments in
charge-coupled device (CCD) image sensors for digital cameras.
Kodak was an early market leader in this area and introduced
the first 1 Megapixel CCD in 1986. Such investments are not
fully consistent with the proposed argument, since CCDs can
replace film as image sensors, thus representing a complement-
disrupting technology.
complementary assets and technology. To the
degree that these markets do not function well,
the entrant cannot gain access to complementary
assets (e.g., through contracting) and the incum-
bent may not gain access to external technology
(e.g., through licensing). It is likely to take
time for the entrant to internally develop com-
plementary assets because the adjustment costs
of developing complementary assets in a short
period of time are prohibitive (Dierickx and Cool,
1989; Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky, 2007).
Furthermore, as Teece (1986) argues, the market
for complementary assets is imperfect, because
such assets tend to be cospecialized or specialized
to the firm, creating high transaction costs. In
the absence of these properties, the competitive
supply of complementary assets would cause
the asymmetry between the incumbent and the
entrant to disappear or certainly dissipate. An
analogous set of issues holds for the markets for
technology (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959). How
well markets for technology are able to function
depends on a number of factors, including the
nature of knowledge, intellectual property rights
regime, and related institutions (Arora et al., 2001;
Dushnitsky, 2010; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005;
Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009; Elfenbein, 2007;
Goldfarb, 2008). We discuss possible extensions
that include such issues in the discussion section.
MODEL SETUP
We consider a stylized two-stage model to exam-
ine firms’ investment decisions with respect to a
radical technological change. While radical in the
sense of one generation of a product supplanting
another, the investment may be made along differ-
ent technological trajectories that either preserve or
disrupt a firm’s existing complementary assets. We
term the former type as complement-preserving
trajectory and the latter type as complement-
disrupting trajectory. In the first stage, an
incumbent firm, denoted by I , chooses to invest
along either of the two trajectories. Let r ∈ {0,1}
represent firm I ’s chosen trajectory, where 1 rep-
resents the complement-disrupting trajectory and 0
represents the complement-preserving trajectory.
We assume the market’s preferred trajectory,
denoted by t ∈ {0,1}, is uncertain. We further let
the complement-disrupting trajectory be more
promising, i.e., p = Prob(t = 1) > 0.5. As a result,
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the incumbent faces a trade-off between choosing
a less promising technological trajectory along
which it can leverage its complementary assets
and choosing a more promising technological
trajectory along which it cannot fully leverage
its complementary assets. Given the entrant E
is assumed to lack complementary assets and
the value of p is postulated to be greater than
0.5, the entrant finds it in its interest to invest
in the complement-disrupting trajectory. In this
stage, we assume firm I plays as a Stackelberg
leader who chooses its trajectory r and its R&D
investment level uI before firm E chooses its
R&D investment level uE .6
Firm i ’s technological trajectory, R&D invest-
ment, and the market’s preferred trajectory
together determine the ‘base utility’ of its product,
denoted by V i . In particular, we assume the base
utility for firm E ’s product is V E = δ1 − t uE ,
0 <δ < 1. Namely, while the base utility increases
in its R&D investment, it is discounted by δ if
there is a mismatch between its trajectory (i.e., the
complement-disrupting trajectory) and the realized
market-preferred trajectory. Similarly, if firm I
chooses the complement-disrupting trajectory,
we assume that V I = δ1 − t uI . However, if firm
I chooses the complement-preserving trajectory,
we assume that V I = δt A1 − t uI , where A> 1
represents firm I ’s complementary assets (the
entrant’s complementary assets are normalized
as one). Thus, the critical asymmetry between
the incumbent and the entrant is the incumbent’s
possession of complementary assets along the
complement-preserving trajectory.7 Specifically,
firm I is assumed to have some complementary
6 Furthermore, we also examine a case where the entrant is
the Stackelberg leader; our main results hold. We also examine
the model using a Nash equilibrium, in which the firms move
simultaneously. However, multiple Nash equilibria can exist,
including mixed strategy equilibria, under a simultaneous move
setting. Therefore, for simplicity we focus on the Stackelberg
setting. While there is no direct correspondence between the
particular solutions that characterize the Nash equilibrium and
the Stackelberg game, the basic tensions and trade-offs at play
are present in both. Finally, the fact that the same qualitative
results emerge whether the incumbent or entrant is the leader or
the follower in the Stackelberg game indicates the robustness of
these properties.
7 One could also explore the effect of asymmetry in their techno-
logical capabilities with respect to the different trajectories. If so,
a natural assumption would be that the incumbent is less capable,
perhaps as reflected in a lower marginal return to R&D invest-
ment than the entrant. Clearly, such a property would decrease
the incumbent’s incentive to invest. We wish to explore a, in
some sense, stronger case, where the incumbent has no intrinsic
assets that may increase its product’s base utility,
but such complementary assets are trajectory
specific—they can be leveraged only when the
incumbent chooses the complement-preserving
trajectory and the market prefers the complement-
preserving trajectory. We make this assumption
regarding the limited fungibility of complemen-
tary assets to highlight the central trade-off faced
by the incumbent. At the end of the analysis
section, we show the robustness of the model
by allowing complementary assets to have some
degree of fungibility and retain some value in
the complement-disrupting trajectory. Table 1
summarizes the two firms’ base utility functions
under different scenarios.
In the second stage, the two firms engage
in quantity competition in the market. They
simultaneously and independently choose their
production quantities. Let qi denote firm i ’s
product quantity. We consider a linear demand
system where firm i ’s product price equals
V i −βqi − γ qj with β >γ > 0 for i ∈ {I ,E } and
j ∈ {I ,E }, j = i . This linear demand curve can be
derived by considering a representative consumer
with utility given by V (q1 + q2) = V1q1 +
V2q2 − 12
(
βq21 + 2γ q1q2 + βq22
) (Vives, 2001:
145) and, as a result, the intercept V i in the linear
demand curve can be interpreted as capturing the
base utility of firm i ’s product defined above. A
similar demand relationship has also been used by
Sutton (1997: 58–59) in modeling the impact of
R&D investment on product quality. We normalize
both firms’ marginal production costs to zero.8
Market competition equilibrium in the second
stage
Given the firms’ technological trajectories and
R&D investment levels, we can specify their
second-stage profit functions stemming from prod-
uct market competition. Let i (V I ,V E ) denote
the equilibrium second-stage profit of firm i given
V I and V E . Intuitively, as firm i ’s product base
disadvantage with respect to the complement-disrupting techno-
logical trajectory, but faces, as a result of its complementary
assets, a different decision calculus than that of the entrant.
8 Complementary assets can either increase quality (willingness
to pay) or reduce marginal production cost. What matters is
the wedge between willingness to pay and marginal production
cost (Adner and Zemsky, 2006). For the sake of simplicity,
we normalize marginal production cost to zero and focus on
willingness to pay.
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utility V i increases, its demand increases and
the competitor firm j ’s demand decreases; further-
more, if V i far exceeds V j , firm i can produce
so much that firm j sees the market price even
lower than its marginal production cost, in which
case firm j finds it optimal not to produce at
all. In particular, both firms choose positive pro-
duction quantity if and only if 2βV i − γ V j > 0
for both i= I, E and, in such a case, the equili-
brium production quantities and profits are given
by qi = 14β2−γ 2
(
2βVi − γ Vj
)
and i (VI , VE ) =
βq2i . However, if 2βV i − γ V j > 0 holds for
only one firm, for example, i = I , then only
firm I produces and we have qI = 12β VI , qE =
0, I (VI , VE ) = βq2I , and E (V I ,V E ) = 0. This
is similarly true for i = E .
R&D investment equilibrium and incumbent
trajectory choice in the first stage
Following the literature (Rosen, 1991; Sutton,
1997), we assume that the cost of achieving
ui , C (ui ), is sufficiently convex such that all
profit functions have an interior optimum.9 Let
ri (uI , uE ) be firm i ’s expected total profit given
uI and uE , if firm I chooses trajectory r . Thus,
we have
1i (uI , uE ) = pi (uI , uE )
+ (1 − p)i (δuI , δuE ) − C (ui ) (1)
0i (uI , uE ) = pi (δuI , uE )
+ (1 − p)i (AuI , δuE ) − C (ui )
(2)
Conditional on firm I ’s trajectory choice
r , let ur∗i denote firm i ’s R&D invest-
ment in equilibrium. In particular, we have
ur∗I = arg maxuI
∑r
I
(
uI , u
r
E (uI )
)
, where urE (uI ) =
arg max
uE
∑r
E (uI , uE ) and ur∗E = urE
(
ur∗I
)
. Let
r∗i  ri
(
ur∗I , u
r∗
E
)
be firm i ’s equilibrium total
profit given firm I ’s trajectory choice r and let
qrti be firm i ’s equilibrium production quantity
9 Technically, when C (ui ) is convex and its second-order
derivative is sufficiently large everywhere, each firm i ’s expected
total profit is quasi-concave in ui , and, thus, there exists a unique
and finite investment level ui that maximizes its expected total
profit.
given firm I ’s trajectory choice r and the market
preference t . Firm i ’s equilibrium total profit
r∗i is the expected value with respect to the
uncertain market preference, given firm i ’s tra-
jectory choice r . However, firm i ’s equilibrium
production quantity qrti is the realized value
given both firm i ’s trajectory choice r and the
realization of market preference t . In equilibrium,
firm I chooses trajectory r = 0 over r = 1 if and
only if 0∗I > 1∗I .
ANALYSIS
In this section, we address the central question we
posed in the Introduction: why incumbent firms
often invest significant amounts in radical inno-
vations, but develop inferior versions of the new
technology. We investigate when the two firms’
trajectories differ, which firm invests more, and
which firm leads the market in terms of achieving
larger market share; in particular, we focus on
how the answers to these questions depend on the
size of the incumbent’s complementary asset A,
the mismatch discount factor δ, and the market
preference probability p. It is important to note
that the comparison in terms of ex post market
outcome may be different than the comparison in
terms of ex ante investment. Specifically, although
the investment amount and market outcome have a
one-to-one relationship when the two firms choose
the same technological trajectory, such a relation-
ship does not hold when they are likely to take
different technological trajectories. With heteroge-
neous technological trajectories, an equal invest-
ment in R&D may not lead to an equal market
outcome.
Firm behavior: trajectory choices, investment
level, and market share
Proposition 1 shows that these comparisons can
be characterized by different regions defined
by three threshold values of the incumbent’s
complementary assets. Proposition 2 provides
existence conditions for these regions.
Proposition 1: For any 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, there exist
three thresholds10 Ar (δ) ≤ Au (δ) ≤ Al (δ) such that
10 The superscript ‘r’ refers to the threshold regarding the
incumbent’s trajectory choice ‘r ,’ above which the incumbent
chooses the complement-preserving trajectory. The superscript
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i) if 1 < A < Ar (δ), firm I chooses the complement-
disrupting trajectory r=1 (i.e., 0∗I < 1∗I ) , ii) if
Ar (δ) < A < Au (δ), firm I chooses the complement-
preserving trajectory r=0 (i.e., 0∗I > 1∗I ) and
invests less than firm E, iii) if Au (δ) < A < Al (δ),
firm I chooses the complement-preserving trajec-
tory r=0 (i.e., 0∗I > 1∗I ),invests more than firm
E, but does not lead the market (i.e., q01I < q01E )
if the market prefers the complement-disrupting
trajectory t=1, iv) if Al (δ) < A, firm I chooses
the complement-preserving trajectory r=0, invests
more than firm E and leads the market (i.e., q01I >
q01E ), even if the market prefers the complement-
disrupting trajectory t=1 .
Proposition 2: For any 0 ≤ δ < 1, there exists
0 < p (δ) < 1 such that Ar (δ) > 1 when p > p (δ).
Further, there exists δ > 0 such that for all δ < δ,
Au (δ) < Al (δ) .
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that firm I ’s trajectory choice
and investments depend on both the level of
complementary assets and the penalty from tech-
nical mismatch. A higher level of complemen-
tary assets encourages the incumbent to choose
the complement-preserving trajectory and encour-
ages larger investment given its choice of the
complement-preserving trajectory. Further, when
we look at the choice of technological trajectory
and investment level simultaneously, various inter-
esting possibilities emerge. Specifically, by vary-
ing the degree of heterogeneity with regard to the
stock of complementary assets and the penalty
from technical mismatch, Proposition 1 character-
izes distinct regimes with respect to choices of
technological trajectory and product market out-
comes. Table 2 summarizes these results. Figure 1
illustrates these regimes for the case where p= 0.7,
β = 1 and γ = 0.5, where the vertical axis A cap-
tures the incumbent’s higher complementary assets
(recall the entrant’s complementary assets are nor-
malized as one), while the horizontal axis δ cap-
tures the penalty from the mismatch between its
chosen trajectory and the realized market-preferred
‘u’ refers to the threshold regarding the comparison of the two
firms’ investment level ‘u ,’ above which the incumbent invests
more. The superscript ‘l ’ refers to the threshold regarding the
incumbent’s market leadership, above which the incumbent leads
in market share.
trajectory. In all the numeric analyses, we use the
cost function C (ui ) = (max(ui − 1, 0))2.11
The dotted region in Figure 1
The dotted region corresponds to a setting in which
the incumbent chooses the complement-disrupting
trajectory and competes on the same basis as the
entrant. In some cases, the incumbent has a mod-
est set of complementary assets and therefore these
complementary assets do not bias the incumbent
away from the complement-disrupting technologi-
cal trajectory. As a result, the incumbent is willing
to give up its historical endowment and take on the
complement-disrupting technological trajectory.
The gray region in Figure 1
The gray region corresponds to a setting in which
the incumbent chooses the complement-preserving
technological trajectory, invests less than the
entrant, and experiences a lower market share
if the market prefers the complement-disrupting
technological trajectory. The lower technological
development on the part of the established firm
may not be the difficulty of altering organizational
routines to fit with the new environment (Leonard-
Barton, 1992; Nelson and Winter, 1982); the lower
research productivity may well be the endogenous
outcome of how the firm chooses to respond to the
technological opportunities they face. Of course,
if the market ends up preferring the complement-
preserving technology, we may observe, ex post ,
that the incumbent invests less than the entrant
but obtains a higher market share. Figure 1,
however, conditions on that the market prefers the
complement-disrupting trajectory and, in such a
scenario, the value of complementary assets A does
not matter. As a result, the incumbent can never
have higher market share since its complementary
assets are not effective.
The white region in Figure 1
The white region depicts a setting in which the
incumbent chooses the complement-preserving
11 This cost function is chosen solely for the ease of numeric
study. It guarantees that the profit function is well behaved.
Further, we can understand the 1 in this functional form as a
normalization of the minimum investment required to enter and
provide a product that achieves some minimum base utility level.
Numeric results are similar if we use a different normalization
value such as 0.5.
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Table 2. Variables and results
Notation Definition
Nature
t ∈ {0,1} The market’s preferred trajectory, where 1 represents the complement-disrupting technological
trajectory and 0 represents the complement-preserving technological trajectory.
Exogenous parameters to be manipulated
p The probability the complement-disrupting trajectory is preferred by the market.
A>1 Incumbent I ’s complementary asset (the entrant’s complementary assets are normalized as
one).
δ The discount in a firm’s R&D effort due to the mismatch between the firm’s chosen
trajectory and the market’s preferred trajectory.
Exogenous parameters not to be manipulated
β, γ Degrees of price sensitivity and product substitution in the demand function at the second
stage.
Investment decisions at the first stage, determined by p, A, δ defined above.
r ∈ {0,1} Incumbent I ’s chosen trajectory, where 1 represents the complement-disrupting technological
trajectory and 0 represents the complement-preserving technological trajectory.
ui R&D investment level by firm i (i = incumbent I and entrant E).
Market outcomes at the second stage, determined by investment decisions at the first stage
V i Firm i’s (i = incumbent I and entrant E) product base utility, determined by the two firms’
trajectory choice and R&D investment.
i (V I ,V E ) The equilibrium second-stage profit of firm i (i = incumbent I and entrant E) given V I and
V E .
Thresholds that define regimes characterizing both investment decisions (r and ui ) and market
outcomes i (V I ,V E )
Ar (δ) The equal trajectory threshold (the upper bound of the dotted region). The superscript ‘r’
refers to the threshold regarding the incumbent’s trajectory choice ‘r ,’ above which the
incumbent chooses the complement-preserving trajectory. The dotted region is where the
incumbent chooses the complement-disrupting trajectory.
Au (δ) The equal investment curve Au (δ) (the boundary between the gray and the black region). The
superscript ‘u’ refers to the threshold regarding the comparison of the two firms’ investment
level ‘u ,’ above which the incumbent invests more. The gray region is where the incumbent
chooses the complement-preserving trajectory, invests less, and has less market share. The
black region is where the incumbent chooses the complement-preserving trajectory, invests
more than the entrant, but has less market share.
Al (δ) The equal market share curve Al (δ) (the lower boundary of the white region). The superscript
‘l ’ refers to the threshold regarding the incumbent’s market leadership, above which the
incumbent leads in market share. The white region is where the incumbent chooses the
complement-preserving trajectory but nonetheless invests more than the entrant and leads in
market share.
Robustness checks
κ1, κ2 The degree to which complementary assets are trajectory specific. If the incumbent chooses the
complement-preserving trajectory r = 0 but the market prefers the complement-disrupting
trajectory t = 1, the incumbent’s effective complementary assets becomes Aκ1 , where
0 ≤ κ1 ≤ 1. Similarly, if the incumbent chooses the complement-disrupting trajectory r = 1,
the incumbent’s effective complementary assets become Aκ2 , 0 ≤ κ2 ≤ 1, whether the market
prefers the complement-preserving or the complement-disrupting trajectory.
trajectory but still ‘wins’ despite the fact that the
market prefers the complement-disrupting trajec-
tory. This setting represents a kind of ‘lock-in’ to
an inferior technology, in that there is an inherent
preference for the complement-disrupting technol-
ogy (δ), but not with sufficient intensity relative
to the incumbent’s stock of complementary assets
(A) to result in displacing the incumbent firm’s
market position.12 This finding is akin to work on
standards or platforms (Arthur, 1989; Shapiro and
Varian, 1999; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012) which shows
12 In Figures 1 and 4, due to the choice of parameter values, the
white region hits the ceiling of the figures when the penalty from
technical mismatch is very high (δ is close to zero). In fact, the
white region exists even when δ is close to zero.
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Figure 1. Illustration of Proposition 1 p = 0.7, β = 1,
γ = 0.5. This figure is conditional on the case where the
complement-disrupting trajectory is preferred by the mar-
ket: (1) The white region is where the incumbent chooses
the complement-preserving trajectory but nonetheless
invests more than the entrant and leads in market share.
(2) The black region is where the incumbent chooses the
complement-preserving trajectory, invests more than the
entrant, but has less market share. It is also the region
highlighted by Proposition 2. (3) The gray region is
where the incumbent chooses the complement-preserving
trajectory, invests less, and has lower market share.
(4) The dotted region is where the incumbent chooses
the complement-disrupting trajectory and competes on the
same basis as the entrant
that inherently inferior technologies may come
to dominate as a result of early market presence
and the presence of strong network externalities.
In the work on standards, the lock-in stems from
the direct effect of network externalities or the
presence of complementary goods or service that
enhance the value of the use of the dominant
technology. Here, the complement is not a distinct
good or service possibly provided by a third
party, but an element of the focal firm’s business
system, possibly in manufacturing, distribution,
or marketing.
If the incumbent has indeed amassed a suffi-
ciently large stock of complementary assets, these
complementary assets may create a sufficient
incentive for the incumbent to invest significantly
more than the entrant. In this case, even if
the incumbent takes an inferior technological
trajectory, the incumbent may still maintain a
larger market share due to its large investment.
Consider the engagement of newspaper firms
in digital media as characterized by Gilbert
(2005) and Kim (2011). Gilbert (2005) shows
that while most newspapers invest significant
financial resources in digital media, they continue
to follow the traditional business models and try
to leverage resources from the print media. Their
newspaper sites often do not incorporate features
such as online forums and search tools commonly
available in new entrants. Kim (2011) shows
that firms such as The New York Times , which
have a large set of complementary assets (e.g.,
content, journalist team, social status), are more
inclined to develop Web sites that create digital
media in a manner similar to that of print media,
while firms such as the Denver Post , which lack
such complementary assets, are more likely to
develop Web sites that are more characteristic of
the technology of digital media. The look and feel
of the two Web sites and the degree of interactive
components seem consistent with this argument.
In contrast, a new entrant, such as Slate or Yahoo,
adopts a pure digital form with little reference to
traditional print news.
Gilbert (2005) uses a cognition lens to explain
this behavior. The perception of the new technol-
ogy as a threat works as the catalyst of change
and, thus, reduces resource rigidity. As such,
firms may be willing to invest a large amount
in financial resources and human resources.
However, the perception of threat also increases
threat rigidity, due to the reduction of information
processing and the constriction of control. Threat
rigidity, in turn, leads to routine rigidity where
firms may integrate the new business with the
parent company, reduce experimentation, and
utilize their existing resources.
The black region in Figure 1
The black region corresponds to the puzzle we
introduced in the beginning of the article; the
incumbent chooses the complement-preserving tra-
jectory, invests more, but achieves a lower market
share than the entrant if the market prefers the
complement-disrupting trajectory. It helps explain
why an incumbent can fare poorly in the face
of radical technological change despite its heavy
investment. In our model, radical technological
change is captured by the fact that, due to the emer-
gence of a complement-disrupting technological
trajectory, the entrant is not in a disadvantageous
position vis-a`-vis the incumbent in terms of tech-
nical capabilities; in that regard, the entrant can
compete on the same basis as the incumbent. Fur-
thermore, the incumbent has to choose between
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the complement-preserving and the complement-
disrupting trajectory to pursue the radical techno-
logical change. Should the incumbent choose the
complement-preserving trajectory, it would have
an incentive to invest more than the entrant due to
the existence of complementary assets, which can
amplify the return from a given level of invest-
ment. However, the existence of complementary
assets also makes it more attractive for the incum-
bent to choose the complement-preserving trajec-
tory, as it can fully leverage complementary assets
when the market prefers this trajectory. When the
parameters are in the black region of Figure 1,
these two forces generate this distinct regime. The
prior examples of Kodak, Polaroid, and NCR all
correspond to this regime. Thus, we suggest that
these firms, despite their unfavorable outcomes,
may have made rational investments that attempted
to engage emerging technologies in ways that
allowed them to leverage their existing comple-
mentary assets. Indeed, as Benner (2010) shows,
stock analysts reacted quite favorably when Kodak
invested in ‘hybrid’ products.
Proposition 1 lays out the overall distribution
of various possible regions; however, it does not
specify the conditions under which each region
will occur. In particular, Proposition 1 consists
of a set of weak inequalities. Proposition 2 char-
acterizes when the distinct regions will, in fact,
exist. Proposition 2 states that for the dotted region
(where the incumbent chooses the complement-
disrupting trajectory) to exist, the likelihood of the
complement-disrupting trajectory being preferred
by the market needs to be sufficiently large. In
other words, it may be possible that the incum-
bent always chooses the complement-preserving
trajectory even when the level of its complemen-
tary assets is very low (i.e., Ar (δ) approaches one
from above). Similarly, Proposition 2 states that
for the black region to exist, the penalty of tech-
nical mismatch needs to be sufficiently high (i.e.,
δ is sufficiently small).
Propositions 1 and 2 characterize a kind of path
dependency, but it differs from the standard notion
of path dependency, which generally suggests
some behavioral mechanism that reinforces the
firm’s current pattern of action and investment.
In our model, the incumbent is acting rationally
and is forward looking. It is induced by its
complementary assets to make its particular
technical choice. The incumbent has the option
to give up its complementary assets and take the
complement-disrupting trajectory, but it may be a
rational decision for it to refrain from doing so. It
is true that the complement-disrupting technologi-
cal trajectory is more likely to be preferred by the
market, but it is uncertain. Therefore, a little bit of
uncertainty and the inducement of complementary
assets can generate the pattern that, ex post , the
incumbent seems to make a mistake. The incum-
bent invests heavily in its complement-preserving
trajectory despite evidence to suggest that the
complement-disrupting trajectory is more likely
to be preferred by the market. Such behavior may
appear irrational and perhaps reflect some pathol-
ogy of organizational inertia. But, ex ante, despite
the likelihood that the complement-disrupting
trajectory may be preferred, it still may be rational
for the incumbent not to, effectively, throw
away their complementary assets and become
equivalent to the entrant. A firm may irrationally
ignore the possible benefits of leveraging new
technologies, but it is important to recognize that
incumbents, in the face of radical technological
change, may be sensibly maximizing their ex ante
expected returns rather than failing to realize the
full strategic implications of their decisions.
Impact of complementary assets on market
outcomes
We next examine the impact of complementary
assets on relative market shares when the market
prefers the complement-disrupting trajectory. This
analysis offers testable implications of the model
and highlights the mechanisms that lead to such
implications.
Proposition 3: There exists 0 < δ < 1 such that
when 0 < δ < δ , p > p (δ), and the complement-
disrupting trajectory is preferred by the mar-
ket, firm I’s market share is nonmonotonic as
A increases from 1 to arbitrarily high levels. In
particular, firm I’s market share is constant with
respect to its level of complementary assets when
A < Ar (δ), at Ar (δ) firm I’s market share drops and
subsequently increases as A expands beyond Ar (δ),
and exceeds firm E’s market share when A > Al (δ).
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3 states that we can observe a non-
monotonic relationship between the level of com-
plementary assets and firm I ’s market share for a
given level of δ when the complement-disrupting
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trajectory is preferred by the market. By recog-
nizing the endogeneity of the firm’s choice of
technological trajectory and, in particular, how this
choice is influenced by the level of complemen-
tary assets, we show that complementary assets
may not only allow incumbents to appropriate
more value given their innovation success (Teece,
1986) and buffer incumbents from exit given
their innovation failure (Tripsas,1997), but by
distorting the incumbent’s choice of technological
trajectory, complementary assets can be linked to
inferior market outcomes in some settings.
This result has two conceptual drivers. One
driver is a switch in ‘regime’ (choice of
complement-preserving or complement-disrupting
trajectory) and the other is the marginal impact of
changes in complementary assets on performance
within the same regime. As a result, an increase
in A may lead to a jump shift downward in
performance with the change in regime. Further
increases lead to incremental increases in market
outcomes within a given regime. Specifically,
when the level of complementary assets is low,
it is not worthwhile for the incumbent to choose
the complement-preserving trajectory. Therefore,
the incumbent chooses the complement-disrupting
trajectory, becoming, in some sense, equivalent to
the entrant. As the level of complementary assets
increases to an intermediate level, however, the
incumbent switches to the complement-preserving
trajectory. Now, when the complement-disrupting
trajectory is preferred, clearly the incumbent will
be penalized, ex post . Note that such penalty is
compensated for by the possibility, albeit perhaps
small, that the complement-preserving trajectory
may be preferred. When the level of complemen-
tary assets is sufficiently high, the incumbent will
do well even if the complement-disrupting tra-
jectory is realized. The firm’s strong performance
is not the result of buffering by complementary
assets. Rather, the firm’s complementary assets
induce the firm to invest in high levels of R&D,
resulting in the superior performance. We illustrate
this case with a numerical example in Figure 2
(δ = 0.8, p= 0.7, β = 1, γ = 0.5). We can see the
incumbent’s market share is U-shaped with respect
to the level of complementary assets when the
complement-disrupting trajectory is preferred by
the market. In particular, we observe a sharp drop
in sales around A = 1.2 (the point at which the
incumbent shifts from the complement-disrupting
to the complement-preserving trajectory).
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Figure 2. Illustration for Proposition 3
Strategic differentiation
Up to this point, the analysis of the incumbent’s
trajectory choice has focused on the incumbent’s
incentive to leverage its complementary assets
as a source of potential competitive advantage
if the firm chooses the complement-preserving
trajectory. However, it is important to note that the
incumbent may also find it optimal to choose the
complementary-preserving trajectory even when
its complementary assets are very small (i.e., A
is close to one). In this case, the incumbent’s
trajectory choice decision is instead driven by
what we call ‘strategic differentiation’—a strategic
choice of a different trajectory from the entrant
merely to mitigate competition.
Consider the case in which the incumbent’s
complementary assets are low. If the incumbent
chooses the complement-disrupting trajectory, it
competes with the entrant in a duopoly regard-
less of the market preference. In contrast, if
the incumbent chooses the complement-preserving
trajectory, it makes a bet on the ultimate nature of
market preferences. Should the market prove to
prefer the technological trajectory adopted by the
incumbent, the incumbent would gain an advan-
tage over the entrant (i.e., obtain higher profit than
the duopoly profit) not only because of its com-
plementary assets, which in any case are low,
but because the market discounts the entrant’s
‘wrong’ trajectory choice. Obviously, under such
a circumstance, the incumbent’s advantage and,
hence, profit, increases as the mismatch discount
is heavier (i.e., δ approaches zero). Of course,
this circumstance arises only if the market prefers
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Figure 3. Effect of market preference probability p on
the equal trajectory threshold Ar (δ)
the complement-preserving trajectory, which hap-
pens with probability 1-p. In other words, should
the market preference prove to be for the
complement-disrupting trajectory, the incumbent
would fare poorly relative to the entrant and earn a
lower profit than the duopoly level achieved when
both the entrant and the incumbent choose the
same, complement-disrupting trajectory.
As a result, it is clear that the incumbent
would prefer strategic differentiation only when
there is a reasonable chance that the market will
prefer the complement-preserving trajectory (i.e.,
the probability the market prefers the complement-
disrupting trajectory p is close to 0.5) and the
mismatch discount is sufficiently severe (i.e., a
low value of δ). We find that the incumbent
indeed prefers strategic differentiation under these
cases. For example, in Figure 3, when the market
preference probability p equals 0.6, the trajectory
choice threshold Ar (δ) equals one for all δ < 0.25.
This implies that when the incumbent finds the two
trajectories almost equally promising or when the
market preference is most uncertain, the incumbent
will always choose the complement-preserving
trajectory even when its complementary assets are
very low. Although the market preference for the
two trajectories is nearly equal, the incumbent
finds it preferable to choose the complement-
preserving trajectory to avoid competition with
the entrant given that the entrant will choose the
complement-disruption trajectory.
The intensity of product market competition,
as determined by the ratio of the parameters
β and γ in the demand function, also affects
the value of the threshold Ar . As the ratio γ /β
approaches one, the products become closer
substitutes and, as a result, the incumbent finds
strategic differentiation increasingly favorable.
This incentive for strategic differentiation, in turn,
leads to a decrease in the threshold Ar .
The incumbent’s incentive for strategic differ-
entiation has an interesting implication: the equal
trajectory threshold Ar (δ) (the upper bound of the
dotted region) exhibits an inverse-U shape as δ
changes from 1 to 0 (Figure 1). This nonlinear
relationship implies that for an incumbent with
low complementary assets, it is less profitable to
choose the complement-disrupting trajectory when
δ is either too large (close to 1) or too low (i.e.,
close to 0), but more profitable to do so when
δ is moderate. While the complement-preserving
trajectory is obviously attractive to the incumbent
when it can leverage its complementary asset with
a low mismatch penalty (δ relatively high), the
complement-preserving trajectory is also attractive
to the incumbent when the mismatch penalty
is high (δ relatively low) because the benefit
from the strategic differentiation increases as the
mismatch penalty increases (i.e., δ decreases).
As discussed in the prior paragraph, a higher
mismatch penalty means that the entrant’s product
would be more severely discounted in consumers’
valuations. In the extreme case when δ = 0,
the incumbent would gain a monopoly profit
should the incumbent choose the complementary-
preserving trajectory and the markets prefer this
trajectory. As the market preference probability
p approaches 0.5, the incumbent’s incentive
for strategic differentiation increases, leading
to a more pronounced downward slope for the
inverse-U shape of the equal trajectory threshold.
For example, when p=0.6 , the threshold Ar (δ)
first increases and then decreases to and remains
at zero as δ decreases from 1 to 0 (Figure 3).
To summarize, we find that the incumbent’s
choice of strategic differentiation could be an ex
ante rational choice given high technical uncer-
tainty and competitive interactions in product
markets. Thus, technological strategies that may
appear to be associated with inertia (Leonard-
Barton, 1992) may be driven by an incentive to
minimize competitive interaction. The influence
of competitive interaction on firms’ innovation
activities has received growing interest in the
field of technological strategy, complementing
the consideration of internal resource allocation
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(Adner and Zemsky, 2005; Turner, Mitchell, and
Bettis, 2010). Supplementing this stream of prior
work, we show that in the presence of uncertainty,
strategic differentiation need not require engaging
distinct segments of the product market. Rather,
the differentiation can occur by placing different
bets on more or less promising technological
trajectories.
We have discussed the shape of the equal
trajectory threshold as the mismatch discount
factor δ and the market preference probability p
change. Finally, we briefly discuss the impact of
these two parameters on the other two thresholds.
Both the equal market share curve Al (δ) (the
lower boundary of the white region) and the equal
investment curve Au (δ) (the lower boundary of the
black region) increase nearly monotonically in δ as
Figure 1 shows, because a larger penalty associated
with the choice of the less preferred technological
trajectory requires a higher level of complemen-
tary assets to compensate and generate equal
investment incentives and market outcome.13 We
also vary the market preference probability p. The
two thresholds increase in p since a higher p value
provides the entrant with a higher expected payoff
over the incumbent, who chooses the less promis-
ing trajectory. As a result, the entrant increases
its investment level with p. Consequently, the
incumbent requires a higher level of complemen-
tary assets to justify a higher investment level that
matches the entrant’s (i.e., Au increases in p) or
to achieve a guaranteed leading position in terms
of market share (i.e., Al increases in p).
Robustness to fungible complementary assets
In our analysis, we assumed that the incumbent
is able to leverage its complementary assets only
when it chooses the complement-preserving trajec-
tory and the complement-preserving trajectory is
preferred by the market (second to last column of
Table 1). We made this assumption to focus on the
central mechanism at work in determining firms’
choices and their market outcomes. In this section,
13 The equal market share curve Al (δ) increases monotonically.
However, there is a slight drop between the upward increasing
part and the flat part of the equal investment curve Au (δ). This
drop is caused by the exit of the incumbent’s product when the
market favors the complement-disrupting trajectory at a criti-
cal threshold of δ such that 2βV I − γ V E = 2βδuI − γ uE = 0.
Given the exit of the incumbent from product market competi-
tion, the entrant reduces its investment ex ante and, as a result,
the equal investment curve Au (δ) drops at this point.
we relax this assumption by allowing for a cer-
tain degree of fungibility of complementary assets
in the case that the complement-disrupting trajec-
tory is preferred.14 The last column of Table 1
presents a fairly general form of the fungibility
of complementary assets. If the incumbent chooses
the complement-preserving trajectory r = 0 but the
market prefers the complement-disrupting trajec-
tory t = 1, then the incumbent can still lever-
age its complementary assets but suffers from
a discount in the value of these assets. In par-
ticular, the incumbent’s effective complementary
assets become Aκ1 , where 0 ≤ κ1 ≤ 1. Similarly, if
the incumbent chooses the complement-disrupting
trajectory r = 1, the incumbent can leverage its
complementary assets to only a certain degree,
with the incumbent’s effective complementary
assets becoming Aκ2 , 0 ≤ κ2 ≤ 1.15 We can inter-
pret κ1 and κ2 as the degree to which com-
plementary assets are trajectory specific. When
complementary assets are fully trajectory spe-
cific to the complement-preserving trajectory, then
κ1 = κ2 = 0; that is, the incumbent’s advantage
from complementary assets will disappear if the
firm chooses the complement-disrupting trajectory
or if the firm chooses the complement-preserving
trajectory but the market prefers the complement-
disrupting trajectory. In contrast, when comple-
mentary assets are fully trajectory independent,
then κ1 = κ2 = 1 and the incumbent’s advantage
from complementary assets will be fully retained
regardless of its trajectory choice or which trajec-
tory is ultimately preferred by the market.
Our results are robust to this more general
setup. In particular, the black regime we identified
in Propositions 1 and 2 always exists. The
black regime characterizes the case when the
complementary asset is sufficiently large that the
incumbent prefers the complement-preserving
trajectory and invests more than the entrant,
but the penalty from technical mismatch is
sufficiently high (i.e., the value of δ is sufficiently
14 While we are treating the degree of fungibility as a function
of inherent breadth of applicability of complementary assets,
Taylor and Helfat (2009) point out that effective fungibility
may, to an important degree, be a function of organizational
structures and integrative mechanisms that facilitate resource
sharing across units.
15 We could further introduce a κ3 to separately represent the
case where the firm chooses the complementary-destroying
trajectory and the market prefers the complement-preserving
trajectory, but the mechanisms we show do not change.
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small) that the product market payoff from the
incumbent’s investment greatly diminishes and
the entrant would garner more product market
success should the complement-disrupting tra-
jectory be preferred. The existence of the black
regime persists when κ1, κ2 > 0 because κ1 and
κ2 influence only the incumbent’s preference
between the two trajectories and determine how
large a value of complementary asset A is required
to turn the incumbent’s preference toward the
complement-preserving trajectory.
However, since the factors that affect the degree
to which complementary assets are specific to a
given technological trajectory, κ1 and κ2, can
influence the incumbent’s trajectory choice, the
shape of the regimes in Figure 1 is affected when
we allow for a certain degree of fungibility of
complementary assets. A larger value of κ1 makes
the complement-preserving trajectory more prefer-
able and, hence, leads to higher investment and
profit for the incumbent but lower investment and
profit for the entrant if the incumbent chooses
the complement-preserving trajectory. Therefore,
as κ1 increases, the region (in the A- δ plane) where
the incumbent prefers the complement-disrupting
trajectory (the dotted region) shrinks and the
thresholds of equal investment (the lower bound-
ary of the black region) and equal market share
(the lower boundary of the white region) decrease.
The four figures in Figure 4a show this pattern.
A larger κ2 makes the complement-disrupting
trajectory more preferable and, hence, it leads to
higher investment and profit for the incumbent
but lower investment and profit for the entrant if
the incumbent chooses the complement-disrupting
trajectory. In contrast to its impact on trajectory
choice, κ2 does not affect the equal investment
and equal market share thresholds because these
thresholds only apply when the complement-
preserving trajectory is chosen. If the complement-
preserving trajectory is chosen, the value of κ2
does not affect the outcome (i.e., the two firms’
investment decisions). Therefore, as κ2 increases,
the dotted region will expand and may ultimately
encompass part or all of the gray region. The four
figures of Figure 4b show this pattern.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Complementary assets not only shield firms
from radical technical changes, but also affect
investment incentives. While the existing literature
has made the important point that complementary
assets can, ex post , influence product market and
financial outcomes, the potential effect of com-
plementary assets on economic incentives for ex
ante investment behavior has been underexplored.
In this work, we examine how the incumbent’s
complementary assets impact its choice of techno-
logical trajectory, as well as its investments along
the chosen trajectory.
Technological change generally presents multi-
ple technological trajectories among which a firm
must choose. In making such choices, a firm must
not only evaluate the inherent promise of the alter-
native technologies, but also the degree to which
alternative approaches leverage its existing com-
plementary assets or renders these assets valueless.
Bringing attention to the issue of the existence
of alternative technological trajectories highlights
an important distinction between investment inten-
sity, the qualitative nature of the firm’s investment
(i.e., choice of trajectory), and final product market
outcomes. We formally examine firms’ technology
investment behaviors and outcomes by analyzing
the influence of their complementary assets on
their technological trajectory choices. Our analy-
sis identifies several distinct regimes with corre-
sponding empirical implications regarding invest-
ment levels, trajectory choices, and product market
outcomes. In particular, we are able to identify
settings in which established firms make substan-
tial technological investments in the face of radical
technical change, but may pursue inferior techno-
logical trajectories in order to leverage their exist-
ing complementary assets. As a result, the incum-
bent’s inferior market outcome may be a conse-
quence of its endogenous choice of technological
trajectories, rather than a consequence of inferior
technical capabilities. As a result, an incumbent
firm’s trajectory choice may empirically exhibit a
form of path dependency not as a consequence of
cumulative technical knowledge (Dosi, 1982), but
as a consequence of its existing complementary
assets. Further, an incentive for strategic differenti-
ation may amplify this complementary asset-based
path dependence, as the presence of complemen-
tary assets creates a basis for asymmetry in the
firms’ approach to the market that leads to some
mitigation of product market competition.
The distinct regimes identified in this study
can generate nonlinear relationships between
market success and the level of complementary
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(a) Change in the shape of regimes as k1 varies
(b) Change in the shape of regimes as k2 varies
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Figure 4. Robustness to more fungible complementary assets
Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 35: 1257–1278 (2014)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
1276 B. Wu, Z. Wan, and D. A. Levinthal
assets. Firms with low levels of complementary
assets may give up such assets and pursue
complement-disrupting technological trajectories
and, in that respect, become equivalent to the
new entrant. It is also possible that firms with
sufficiently high levels of complementary assets
can still dominate the market, even with the
choice of seemingly less promising technological
trajectories. However, in a broad range of settings,
established firms, with investment decisions influ-
enced by their existing stock of complementary
assets, may choose less promising technological
trajectories and suffer adverse product market
outcomes as a consequence.
Of course, there are a number of limitations
to our analysis that open opportunities for future
research. First, the dynamic nature of the setting
could be enriched. The current study assumes that
complementary assets are fixed and, therefore,
treats them as exogenous parameters. It is cer-
tainly the case that this factor evolves over time
(Pacheco-de-Almeida, 2010). The research could
be extended by examining firms’ investments not
only with respect to R&D investment, but also
with respect to investments in complementary
assets. The investments along these two dimen-
sions may be made simultaneously or sequentially.
Further, we treat the technical capabilities of the
firms as being homogenous. In some sense, this
assumption strengthens our findings, as we show
that inertia (keeping to a prior technology) may
emerge even in the absence of the incumbent
having an inherent disadvantage in the new
complement-disrupting technology. However, a
more general model would allow for the possi-
bility of heterogeneity of technical capabilities
along different technological trajectories, whether
as an inherent property of the firm’s ‘type’ or
an outcome of prior R&D investment activity, as
well as heterogeneous complementary assets.
Second, as discussed in the model setup, a crit-
ical assumption is that the market for complemen-
tary assets and technical capabilities are imperfect
and, as such, an entrant cannot gain access to
complementary assets (e.g., through contracting),
while the incumbent may not gain access to exter-
nal technology (e.g., through licensing). Relaxing
this working assumption can lead to a fruitful
research avenue that examines the role of licens-
ing or mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activi-
ties between the incumbent and the entrant (Gans,
Hsu, and Stern, 2002; Gans and Stern, 2000).
Building on the logic of Gans and Stern (2000),
in the presence of licensing, alliances, and M&As,
complementary assets can increase the incum-
bent’s bargaining power in the licensing process,
thereby lowering the licensing fee paid to the
entrant. The effects of complementary assets on the
licensing fees that might be earned by an entrant, in
turn, amplify the incumbent’s preinnovation incen-
tives, as well as its postinnovation returns. A large
stock of complementary assets would favor the
incumbent by enhancing its returns on R&D rela-
tive to the entrant. This is, ultimately, the critical
factor underlying our results regarding the ratio-
nality of the incumbent’s R&D investments in
the face of radical technical change. Furthermore,
the choice of technological trajectory in a given
domain may impact the cost and effectiveness with
which a firm can access and acquire these capabili-
ties in the form of licensing, alliances, and acquisi-
tions (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Future research
can extend this line of investigation to settings of
broader innovation ecosystems (Kapoor and Lee,
2012).
While these are important possible extensions,
the current effort provides an important enrich-
ment of our current treatment of the effect of
complementary assets. Complementary assets are
not merely asset stocks that buffer firms from
competitive dynamics; they are also an impor-
tant element of the investment context for firms’
R&D decisions. Complementary assets can be
leveraged to amplify the returns to an existing
competitive position, but that act of leverage is
not neutral with respect to the direction of the
firm’s technical efforts. In this regard, comple-
mentary assets have a dual role, somewhat akin
to the duality of network ties as ‘pipes,’ con-
veying resources, and ‘prisms,’ providing gen-
eral signals of quality and legitimacy, put forth
by Podolny (2001). Complementary assets are a
resource. As noted by a number of prior schol-
ars, such resources may buffer firms from subse-
quent competitors (Mitchell, 1989; Tripsas, 1997).
However, these resources also influence a firm’s
perception of what might constitute more or less
promising technological directions. We examine
the ‘prism’ of complementary assets from a ratio-
nal choice, profit-maximizing perspective, as we
highlight some of the tensions between the incen-
tive to leverage existing resources and the need to
make technologically appropriate choices, and we
suggest how the balance of such tensions may help
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explain some of the empirical patterns and puzzles
we observe.
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